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Abstract
Natural deduction systems for classical, intuitionistic and modal logics were deeply investigated by Prawitz [D. Prawitz, Natural
Deduction: A Proof-theoretical Study, in: Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, vol. 3, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm, 1965.
Reprinted at: Dover Publications, Dover Books on Mathematics, 2006] from a proof-theoretical perspective. Prawitz proved weak
normalization for classical logic only for a language without ∨, ∃ and with a restricted application of reduction ad absurdum.
Reduction steps related to ∨, ∃ and classical negation bring about many problems solved only rather recently. For classical
S5 modal logic, Prawitz defined a normalizable system, but for a language without ∨, ∃, ♦ and, for a propositional language
without ♦, Medeiros [M.da P.N. Medeiros, A new S4 classical modal logic in natural deduction, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71
(3) (2006) 799–809] presented a normalizable system for classical S4. We can mention many cut-free Gentzen systems for S4, S5
and K45/K45D, some normalizable natural deduction systems for intuitionistic modal logics and one more for full classical S4,
but not for full classical S5. Here our focus is on the definition of a classical and normalizable natural deduction system for S5,
taking not only  and ♦ as primitive symbols, but also all connectives and quantifiers, including classical negation, disjunction
and the existential quantifier. The normalization procedure is based on the strategy proposed by Massi [C.D.B. Massi, Provas de
normalizac¸ao˜ para a lo´gica cla´ssica, Ph.D. Thesis, Departamento de Filosofia, UNICAMP, Campinas, 1990] and Pereira and Massi
[L.C. Pereira, C.D.B. Massi, Normalizac¸a˜o para a lo´gica cla´ssica, in: O que nos faz pensar, Cadernos de Filosofia da PUC-RJ, vol.
2, 1990, pp. 49–53] for first-order classical logic to cope with the combined use of classical negation, disjunction and the existential
quantifier. Here we extend such results to deal with  and ♦ too. The elimination rule for ♦ uses the notions of connection and of
essentially modal formulas already proposed by Prawitz for the introduction of . Beyond weak normalization, we also prove the
subformula property for full S5.
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1. Introduction
Natural deduction systems for classical, intuitionistic and modal logics were deeply investigated by Prawitz from
a proof-theoretical perspective. In his seminal work [14], Prawitz proved weak normalization for classical logic only
for a language without ∨, ∃ and with a restricted application of ⊥c (reduction ad absurdum) to atomic formulas. In
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the case of intuitionistic logic, Prawitz proved weak normalization for the whole language by using the notion of
segment. For minimal and intuitionistic S4/S5 modal logics, Prawitz also defined normalizable systems, but for a
language without ♦, and for classical S4/S5 modal logics, Prawitz’s normalizable systems not only exclude ♦, but also
∨ and ∃ as primitive symbols. Recently, Medeiros [6] showed that Prawitz’s normalization procedure for classical
S4 does not work and defined a propositional system without ♦ in which every deduction can be transformed into a
normal form.
Reduction steps related to disjunction, existential quantifier and classical negation brought about many problems
that were not easy to solve. The first proof, though indirect, of weak normalization for the whole classical language is
due to Statman [20]. Direct proofs without restriction to the application of reduction ad absurdum to atomic formulas
were presented only rather recently [16,5,13,19].
In the case of modal logics, there was also a great effort to define cut-free/normalizable adequate systems. Some of
the pioneer Gentzen-type systems for S5 are the ones presented in [11,12]. In a sense, they are the sequent-calculus
version of the first two non-normalizable modal systems introduced by Prawitz in [14]. However, in these systems,
Gentzen’s Hauptsatz does not hold since no cut-free proof is possible for the sequent ⇒ ¬α, α. Now, we can
mention cut-free Gentzen systems for K45/K45D [17] whose cut-elimination results are not extensible to S5, cut-free
sequent systems for S4/S5 [8,15,9,22,7,2,1,10], normalizable natural deduction systems for intuitionistic modal logics
[18,4] and for full classical S4 [3], but not for full classical S5.
Here our focus is on the definition of a classical natural deduction system for full S5, a normalizable one, taking not
only  and ♦ as primitive symbols, but also all connectives and quantifiers, including classical negation, disjunction
and the existential quantifier. The normalization procedure is based on the strategy proposed by [5,13] for first-order
classical logic to cope with the combined use of classical negation, ∨ and ∃. Here we extend such results to deal with
 and ♦ too. Moreover, the elimination rule for ♦ will also use the notions of connection and of essentially modal
formulas already proposed by Prawitz for the introduction of . The employment of such concepts will be essential
to preserve correctness after reductions.
In the next section, preliminary definitions and rules for the whole system will be introduced. The rewriting process
in the normalization procedure will be reflected by reductions presented in Section 3. Since our modal rules have global
restrictions, at the end of this section we will also add comments about the preservation of correctness after reduction
steps. The sketches of the proof of the weak normalization and the subformula property will be shown in Section 4.
Finally, in the last section, we will sum up our work, and compare our system with some of the existing ones.
2. A natural deduction system for full classical S5
The first-order language L for S5 is considered as usual. Formulas are inductively defined with ⊥ (absurdity), ∧
(conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (implication), ¬ (negation), ∀ (universal quantifier), ∃ (existential quantifier), ♦
(possibility modal operator) and  (necessity modal operator) as primitive logical constants. ⊥ is here considered as
an atomic formula. α, β, γ , . . . will be used as meta-variables for formulas, and Γ , ∆ as meta-variables for a set of
formulas.
Introduction (∧I, ∨I1, ∨I2, →I, ¬I, ∀I, ∃I) and elimination (∧E1, ∧E2, ∨E, →E, ¬E, ∀E, ∃E) rules, and also
intuitionistic and classical absurdity rules (⊥i and ⊥c) are exactly as in classical logic [14,21]. In order to define
normalizable rules for ♦ and , the notion of the essentially modal formula is introduced:
Definition 2.1 (Essentially Modal). A formula α is essentially modal if whenever β is an atomic subformula of α,
either β is ⊥ or β is within the scope of  and/or ♦.
Definition 2.1 (without references to ♦1) was first presented by Prawitz in [14]. For essentially modal formulas,
the following theorem is proved in [14]2 (the converse holds without any restrictions to α):
Theorem 2.2. If α is essentially modal, then both ♦α→ α and α→ α are S5 theorems.
Our definition of deduction is the usual one as presented in [21]. The notions of assumption (or top-formula);
conclusion (or end-formula); occurrence of a formula (or formula occurrence); shape/form of a formula; side-
1 Remember that Prawitz did not take ♦ as a primitive symbol in his modal natural deduction systems.
2 In fact, Prawitz only proved that α→ α is a theorem. For ♦α→ α, the result is easily checked if one considers the definition of ♦ as ¬¬.
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connected formulas; premises of an inference rule; consequence of an inference rule; major premise; minor premise;
a formula that occurs (immediately) above/below another; free variables of a formula α (notation FV(α)); the
substitution of a variable x by a term t in a formula α (notation α[x/t]) are taken as in [21].
Deductions will be graphically represented as a proof-tree, generated by successive applications of inference rules,
with assumptions as the leaves of the tree, and conclusion as the root. From now on, the expressions deduction and
proof-tree will be used synonymously. We will use Π and Σ , sometimes indexed, to denote an arbitrary deduction
and a sequence (including the empty one) of deductions, respectively. For additional details about the notation of the
proof-trees, see [14].
Assumptions will be labelled by markers. The set of assumptions of the same form and with the same marker will
be considered as an assumption class. In the proof-tree, [α]u will denote an assumption class where all formulas in the
class have the form α and marker u. All assumptions in a class will be closed, or discharged, by the same application
of an inference rule, indicated by repeating the marker in this application. Assumptions not closed in a deduction Π
are said to be open, and Π is said to depend on such (open) assumptions.
If α is an occurrence of formula in the proof-tree Π , then the subtree of Π determined by α is the proof-tree
obtained from Π by removing all formula occurrences except α and the ones above α. A formula occurrence α in
a deduction Π is said to depend on the set Γ of (open) assumptions in Π if the subtree of Π determined by α is a
deduction depending on Γ . If β ∈ Γ , then we say that α depends on the formula β in Π .
The following definitions and restrictions will be essential in the formulation of normalizable rules I and ♦E.
Prawitz’s definition of connection was presented to first-order classical logic and then extended to classical S5, taking
only  into account. [14]. Here we modify his definition to cope with ♦ too.
Definition 2.3 (Connection). By a connection C in a deduction Π between two formula occurrences α and β, we
understand a sequence 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 of formula occurrences in Π such that α1 = α, αn = β, and one of the following
conditions holds for each i ≤ n:
(1) αi is not the major premise of an application of ∨E, ∃E and ♦E, and αi+1 stands immediately below αi ; or vice
versa;
(2) αi is a premise of an application of→E or ¬E, and αi+1 is side-connected with αi ;
(3) αi is the major premise of an application of ∨E, ∃E and ♦E, and αi+1 is an assumption discharged by this
application; or vice versa;
(4) αi is a consequence of an application of→I, ¬I, ⊥c, and αi+1 is an assumption discharged by this application; or
vice versa;
Definition 2.4 (Modally Independent). Two formula occurrences α and β are said to be modally independent in a
deduction Π iff every connection in Π between α and β contains an occurrence of an essentially modal formula.
Our rules are shown in Table 1. All of them, including ♦I, I and E, were already presented in [14], but
our version of ♦E is quite new. The first version of Prawitz’s rule for I was graphically presented as in Table 1.
However, the restriction to the introduction of  was a different one, namely: every open assumption that α depends
on must be modal (prefixed with ), or the negation of a modal formula. In [14], Prawitz proved that this rule is not
normalizable. He then introduced both the notion of essentially modal formula and of connection in order to cope
with problems that arise in the rewriting steps related to the normalization procedure for modal operators.3 Finally,
he proved weak normalization for classical S5 without ∨, ∃ and ♦-rules. Similar problems also arise if one wants to
design a normalizable rule for ♦. It Section 3.2, we will argue that applications of rules ♦E andI still remain correct
after reductions. Following Prawitz’s terminology, this system will be denoted CS5, for classical S5.
Completeness and correctness are proved in relation to the first and fourth versions, respectively, of the modal
natural deduction systems presented in [14]. Completeness is straightforward since Prawitz’s modal rules for I and
♦E in the first system are special cases of our rules. As our rule for I is the same as Prawitz’s in his fourth system,
correctness of ♦E is obtained by deriving this rule within Prawitz’s fourth system taking ♦α as an abbreviation
of ¬¬α. The overall proof of correctness and completeness for our system are in: http://www.lia.ufc.br/∼lilia/
correctcompleteS5.ps.
3 In the case of rules for quantifiers, instead of using the notion of connection, Prawitz proved the lemma on parameters [14] to deal with
comparable problems.
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Table 1
The natural deduction system CS5 for full S5
Γ
Π
α
α I
α
α E
α must be modally independent
inΠ of each formula in Γ .
α
♦α ♦I
♦α
Γ [α]u
Π
β
β
♦E, u
Each formula occurrence in [α]u must be modally independent inΠ
of each formula in Γ and of the minor premise β.
α
α ∨ β ∨I1
β
α ∨ β ∨I2
α ∨ β
[α]u
Π1
γ
[β]v
Π2
γ
γ ∨E, u, v
α β
α ∧ β ∧I
α ∧ β
α
∧E1
α ∧ β
β
∧E2
[α]u
Π
β
α→ β →I, u
α α→ β
β
→E
[α]u
Π⊥
¬α ¬I, u
α ¬α
⊥ ¬E
⊥
α
⊥i
[¬α]u
Π⊥
α ⊥c, u
Π
α[x/y]
∀xα(x) ∀I
∀xα(x)
α[x/t] ∀E
y = x or y 6∈ FV (α), and y t is free for x in α(x).
is not free in any assumptions open inΠ .
α[x/t]
∃xα(x) ∃I
∃xα(x)
[α[x/y]]u
Π
β
β
∃E, u
t is free for x in α(x). y = x or y 6∈ FV (α), y 6∈ FV (β), and y is not free
in any assumption open inΠ except [α[x/y]]u .
3. Reductions
The normalization procedure is a rewriting process that transforms any deduction Π1 to a normal deduction Π2
obtained from Π1 through reduction steps. Reductions will be defined in order to eliminate each type of maximum
segment (see Definition 3.3) that represents some sort of detour in a deduction. Before presenting them, the central
notion of normal form and other required definitions will be introduced.
Definition 3.1 (Thread). A thread is a sequence of formulas α1, α2, . . . αn in a deduction Π such that αi occurs
immediately above αi+1, 1 ≤ i < n, α1 is a top-formula, and αn is the end-formula of Π . In this case, we say that a
thread is determined by α1.
Definition 3.2 (Segment). A segment in a deduction Π is a sequence σ = α1, α2, . . . , αn , with length n, of
consecutive occurrences of formulas in a thread of Π , such that:
(1) α1 is not a conclusion of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E;
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(2) αi , (i < n), is a minor premise of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E; and
(3) αn is not a minor premise of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E.
We will extend the usual definition of maximum segment (see [5,13]) by including references to ♦E as follows.
Definition 3.3 (Maximum Segment). Let σ = α1, α2, . . . , αn be a segment. We can classify it, depending on αn , as:
(1) αn is a conclusion of an application of an introduction rule, or of an application of ⊥i , or of an application of ♦E,
∨E or ∃E, and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule;
(2) αn is a conclusion of an application of ⊥c, and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule;
(3) αn is a conclusion of an application of ⊥c, or of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E, and it is, at the same time, a
minor premise of ¬E, where the major premise is a top-formula;
For simplicity, since we are not worried about strong normalization here, we will define the notion of normal form
of a deduction without eliminating redundant applications of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E.
Definition 3.4 (Normal Form of a Deduction). A deduction in CS5 that does not contain any occurrence of maximum
segments is said to be Normal, or to be in a Normal Form.
3.1. Reduction steps
As usual, reductions will be classified as operational, permutative and those related to the absurdity sign. Since
operational reductions for→,∨,∧, ∃,∀,¬, intuitionistic absurdity reduction, and permutative reductions for ∨, ∃ are
as in [14,21], we will omit them. Our focus will be on the reductions for ♦ and , and on the classical absurdity
reductions.
In the following situations, each deduction on the right is an immediate reduction (notation BiB) of the one on
the left. The reducibility relation, denoted by BB, is the transitive closure of BiB. In Section 3.2, the correctness of
deductions after reductions is discussed.
(1) Operational Reductions
(a) Operational Reduction for ♦
Π1
α
♦α ♦I
[α] j
Π2
β
β
Π3
♦E j
BB
i
Π1[α]
Π2
β
Π3
Remark 3.5. Note that an application of I and ♦E in Π3 could exist, and ♦α could have been used as
the essentially modal formula in connections. In Section 3.2, we will deeply analyse the preservation of
correctness in this case.
(b) Operational Reduction for 
Π1
α
α I
α E
Π2
BB
i
Π1
α
Π2
Remark 3.6. As above, note that an application of I and ♦E in Π2 could exist, and α could have been
used as the essentially modal formula in connections. We will analyse this case in Section 3.2.
(2) Permutative Reduction for ♦
In all permutative reductions, restrictions over applications ofI and♦E, if any, are respected since connections
are preserved.
Π1
♦α
[α] j
Π2
β
β
♦E j Σ3
τ R
BB
i Π1
♦α
[α] j
Π2
β Σ3
τ R
τ ♦E j
A.T. Martins, L.R. Martins / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 152 (2008) 132–147 137
Remark 3.7. β is the major premise of the elimination rule R. Σ3 occurs at the left of β if R is→E or ¬E.
(3) Classical Absurdity Reductions4
(a)
[¬α]k
Π1⊥
α ⊥c k Σ2
γ R
BB
i
α j Σ2
γ R ¬γ i
⊥
[¬α] j
Π ∗1⊥
γ i
Π ∗1 is obtained from Π1 by substitution of all deductions of the following shape
Πn
α ¬αk
⊥
to
Πn
α Σ2
γ R ¬γ i
⊥.
Remark 3.8. α is the major premise of the elimination rule R. Σ2 occurs at the left of α if R is →E or ¬E.
Note that all new connections pass through ¬α and restrictions on any applications of I and ♦E in Π ∗1 , if
any, are respected. In Section 3.2, we will also analyse this case.
(b)
[¬β] j
Π⊥
β
⊥c j [¬β]k
⊥ R
BB
i
[¬β]k
Π⊥
(c)
Π1
α1 ∨ α2
[α1] j
Π2
β
[α2]w
Π3
β
β
∨E j,w [¬β]k
⊥ R
BB
i
Π1
α1 ∨ α2
[α1] j
Π2
β [¬β]k
⊥ R
[α2]w
Π3
β [¬β]k
⊥ R
⊥ ∨E j,w
(d)
Π1∃xα(x)
[α] j
Π2
β
β
∃E j [¬β]k
⊥ R
BB
i Π1∃xα(x)
[α] j
Π2
β [¬β]k
⊥ R
⊥ ∃E j
(e)
Π1
♦α
[α] j
Π2
β
β
♦E j [¬β]k
⊥ R
BB
i Π1
♦α
[α] j
Π2
β [¬β]k
⊥ R
⊥ ♦E j
4 All classical absurdity reductions, but the one provided for ♦, are first presented in [5,13].
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3.2. Comments about correctness after reductions
The introduction rule for , I, and the elimination rule for ♦, ♦E, have global restrictions that must be preserved
after reduction steps. In general, it is easy to check that this is really the case and, in this section, we will only analyse
the worst situations.
First, we need to state the concepts of immediate connection and connection detour:
Definition 3.9 (Immediate Connection). Let C be a connection in a deduction Π . C is an immediate connection if
and only if it only contains two formula occurrences of Π .
Definition 3.10 (Connection Detour). Let C be a connection in a deduction Π that contains C ′, an immediate
connection. C ′ is a connection detour of C if and only if C ′ is a connection determined by item (4) of Definition 2.3.
3.2.1. Correctness of I after reduction steps
Recall rule I and its global restriction:
Π
α
α I
Restrictions over I: Let β be a top-formula such that α depends on β. Then α must be modally independent in Π
of β, that is, every connection in Π between α and β must contain an occurrence of an essentially modal formula γ .
Now suppose that such a formula occurrence γ of an application of I in a deduction Π ′ is also a maximum
segment. In this case, we have to assure that, after applying the reduction that eliminates γ , the resulting deduction
Π ∗ is also correct and follows the restriction over I.
In the situations below, we will argue the correctness of Π ∗ when: (1) γ is of the form δ, the conclusion of I
and the major premise of E; (2) γ is of the form ♦δ, the conclusion of ♦I and the major premise of ♦E; (3) γ is a
maximum segment of type (2).5
(1) γ is of the form δ, the conclusion of I and the major premise of E:
In this case, Π is of the following form:
@  
Σ1
δ
δ I
δ
E
Γ1 [β1]
@  

Σ2
α
Γ2 [β2]
where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and both β1 and β2 belong to the same assumption class [β].
Note that δ is obtained in Π by an application of I. Thus, δ is modally independent of any assumption on
which δ depends.
The resulting deduction Π ∗1 ⊆ Π ∗ is of the following form:
@  
Σ1
δ
Γ1 [β1]
@  
Σ2
α
Γ2 [β2]
5 The other cases can be easily proved.
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Now, we have the following cases depending on the connection C that contains δ in Π :
(a) C occurs between an assumption of the form β1 and α:
In this case, observe that the premise δ ofI depends on β1. Thus, each connection in Σ1 between δ and β1
contains an essentially modal formula ϕ. Observe that ϕ also occurs in Π ∗1 and assures the correctness of Π ∗.
(b) C occurs between an assumption of the form β2 and α:
In this case, since C contains δ, it also contains a connection detour between an assumption ψ in Σ1 and
a formula occurrence ρ in Σ2. To better illustrate this, we will present the following example where Π ′ is of
the following form:
ψu1 ψ1 → δ1
δ1 →E
δ1 I
δ1 E σ
δ1 ∧σ ∧I
ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ) →I, u
In this example, ψ is ψ1, δ is δ1, β2 is σ , α is ψ1 → (δ1 ∧ σ) and ρ is α. Note that the
connections 〈ψu1 ,ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ)〉 and 〈ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ),ψu1 〉 are connection detours.
Now we will enumerate all connections6 in Π ′ between β2 and α:
(i) C1 = 〈σ,δ1 ∧σ,ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ)〉
(ii) C2 = 〈ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ),δ1 ∧σ,σ 〉
(iii) C3 = 〈σ,δ1 ∧σ,δ1,δ1,δ1,ψ1,ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ)〉
(iv) C4 = 〈ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ),ψ1,δ1,δ1,δ1,δ1 ∧σ,σ 〉
(v) C5 = 〈σ,δ1 ∧σ,δ1,δ1,δ1,ψ1 → δ1,ψ1,ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ)〉
(vi) C6 = 〈ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ),ψ1,ψ1 → δ1,δ1,δ1,δ1,δ1 ∧σ,σ 〉
We are concerned with connections between β2 and α that contain γ . In our case, γ is δ1 and the con-
nections that contain γ are C3, C4, C5 and C6. Note that all connections that contain γ also contain one of the
connection detours 〈ψu1 ,ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ)〉 or 〈ψ1 → (δ1 ∧σ),ψu1 〉.
If we observe the generic form of Π ′
@  
Σ1
δ
δ I
δ
E
Γ1 [β1]
@  

Σ2
α,
Γ2 [β2]
then we can see that the connection C in the generic Π ′ that contains γ , in this case δ, must also contain
a connection detour between ψ and ρ. Since ψ is only discharged in Σ2, the premise δ of I depends on ψ .
Thus, each connection in Σ1 between δ and ψ contains an essentially modal formula ϕ. Perceive that ϕ also
occurs in Π ∗1 and assures the correctness of Π ∗.
(2) γ is of the form ♦δ, the conclusion of ♦I and the major premise of ♦E:
In this case, Π is of the following form:
6 In this case, it is clear that we do not need to consider cycles.
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Γ1 [β1]
@  
Σ1
δ
♦δ ♦I
Σ2
ϕ
ϕ ♦E, v
[δ]v Γ2 [β2] Γ ∗
@  

Γ3 [β3]
hhhh
hhh
 
Σ3
α
where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, α does not depend on the assumptions in Γ ∗ but ϕ does, and β1, β2 and β3 belong to
the same assumption class [β].
It is important to note that δv is modally independent in Σ2 of ϕ, of the assumptions in Γ2, of the assumptions
in Γ ∗, and of the assumptions of the form β2.
The resulting deduction Π ∗1 ⊆ Π ∗ is of the following form:
Γ1
@
[β1]
 
Σ1[δ]
@
Γ2 [β2]
 
Γ ∗


Σ2
ϕ
@
Γ3 [β3]
 
Σ3
α
Now, we have the following cases depending on the connection C that contains ♦δ in Π :
(a) C occurs between an assumption of the form β1 and α:
Neither β1 nor α are in Σ2. Thus, the connection C between β1 and α that contains δ, and consequently
enters through Σ2, has to contain at least ϕ, an assumption in Γ2, an assumption in Γ ∗, or an assumption of the
form β2 in order to exit Σ2. Since δ is modally independent of ϕ, of the assumptions in Γ2, of the assumptions
in Γ ∗, and of the assumptions of the form β2, the correctness of Π ∗1 is assured.
(b) C occurs between an assumption of the form β2 and α:
Since C contains δ in Π ∗1 and β2 is modally independent of δ, the correctness of Π ∗1 is assured.
(c) C occurs between an assumption of the form β3 and α.
Since C contains δ, a formula occurrence in Σ2, and neither β3 nor α belong to Σ2, C has to enter Σ2 and
then has to exit Σ2. We have one of the following cases:
• C enters Σ2 through δ and exits through ϕ, an assumption in Γ2, an assumption in Γ ∗ or an assumption of
the form β2.
• C enters Σ2 through ϕ, an assumption in Γ2, an assumption in Γ ∗ or an assumption of the form β2, and
exits through δ.
In both cases, since δ is modally independent of ϕ, of the assumptions in Γ2, of the assumptions in Γ ∗, and
of the assumptions of the form β2 the correctness of Π ∗1 is assured.
(3) γ is a maximum segment of type (2):
In this case, Π is of the following form:
Σ3
α
Σ1⊥
γ ⊥c, u Σ2
δ
R
@
Γ3

[β3]
   
  
Γ2
@
[β2]
 
[¬γ ]u
@
Γ1
 
[β1]


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where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, β1, β2 and β3 belong to the same assumption class [β], γ is the major premise of the
elimination rule R and Σ2 occurs at the left of γ if R is→E or ¬E.
The formula γ occurs in a connection C only if C contains a pair of formula occurrences, each immediately
connected with γ . We have the following possibilities of formula occurrences immediately connected with γ :
• The occurrence of ⊥ immediately above γ . Note that ⊥ is an essentially modal formula.
• All occurrences of ¬γ u . As γ is an essentially modal formula, so is ¬γ .
• A formula ϕ1 side-connected with γ when R is→E or ¬E. In this case, since ϕ1 is a subformula of γ , it is also
an essentially modal formula.
• A top-formula ϕ2 of Σ2 discharged by R when R is ♦E, ∨E or ∃E. Since ϕ2 is a subformula of γ , it also is an
essentially modal formula.
• The occurrence of δ immediately below γ when R is not ♦E, ∨E or ∃E. We cannot guarantee that δ is an
essentially modal formula in this case.
Now, we can easily state the set of all possible pairs of formula occurrences immediately connected with γ : {
{⊥,¬γ u}, {⊥, ϕ1}, {⊥, ϕ2}, {⊥, δ}, {¬γ u, ϕ1}, {¬γ u, ϕ2}, {¬γ u, δ}, {ϕ1, δ}, }
We can observe that, in every pair, there is at least one essentially modal formula. Hence, in C , γ is not the
unique essentially modal formula.
The resulting deduction Π ∗1 ⊆ Π ∗ is of the following form:
α
[β3]
 
Γ3
Σ1⊥
δ
⊥c, u2
```
```
γ u1 Σ2
δ
R ¬δu2
⊥ ¬E
[¬γ ] ¬I, u1
hhhh
h Γ1 
[β1]


Γ2
@
[β2]
 
Concerning the correctness of Π ∗1 , we can make the following comments:• Some connections in Π are rearranged in Π ∗1 but, in these cases, they still contain the same elements. For
instance, this is the case of the immediate connection 〈γ,¬γ u〉 in Π and 〈γ u1 ,¬γ 〉 in Π ∗1 . Since they contain
the same elements, correctness is preserved.
• Some connections inΠ are extended inΠ ∗1 by adding the upper occurrence of⊥ illustrated above inΠ ∗1 . Since⊥ is an essentially modal formula, correctness is preserved.
• Some connections in Π are extended in Π ∗1 by adding the occurrence of ¬δu2 , but not the occurrence of⊥ that
stands immediately below ¬δu2 . In these cases, they have to contain the subconnection 〈δ,¬δu2 , δ〉.7 Observe
that these connections originally contain the occurrence of δ illustrated in Π . Thus, if they are between [β] and
α, they also contain an essentially modal formula and correctness is preserved.
• Some new connections between [β] and α may arise in Π ∗1 containing the immediate connection 〈⊥, δ〉8 but,
in these cases, since ⊥ is an essentially modal formula, correctness is preserved.
3.2.2. Correctness of ♦E after reduction steps
Recall rule ♦E and its global restriction:
♦α
[α]u
Π1
β
β
♦E, u
7 The former δ is side-connected with ¬δu2 and the last one is the conclusion of ⊥c, u2.
8 The lower occurrence of ⊥ and δ illustrated in Π ∗1 .
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Restrictions over ♦E: Let Γ be the set of assumptions, other than [α]u , on which β depends. Then each occurrence
of αu must be modally independent in Π1 of each formula in Γ as well as β, that is, in each connection in Π1 between
each occurrence of αu and each formula in Γ as well as β, there is an occurrence of an essentially modal formula δ.
Now suppose that such formula occurrence δ of an application of ♦E in a deductionΠ is also a maximum segment.
In this case, we have to assure that, after applying the reduction that eliminates δ, the resulting deduction Π ∗ is also
correct and follows the restriction over ♦E.
We will present the correctness of Π ∗ when: (1) δ is of the form ϕ, the conclusion of I and the major premise
ofE; (2) δ is of the form ♦ϕ, the conclusion of ♦I and the major premise of ♦E; (3) δ is a maximum segment of type
(2).9
(1) δ is of the form ϕ, the conclusion of I and the major premise of E:
In this case Π1 is of the following form:
@  
Σ1
ϕ
ϕ I
ϕ E
Γ1 [α1]u
@  

Σ2
β
Γ2 [α2]u
where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 and both α1u and α2u belong to the same assumption class [α]u .
It is important to observe that ϕ is obtained in Π1 by an application of I. Thus, ϕ is modally independent of
any assumption on which ϕ depends.
The resulting deduction Π ∗1 ⊆ Π ∗ is of the following form:
@  
Σ1
ϕ
Γ1 [α1]u
@  
Σ2
β
Γ2 [α2]u
Now, we have the following cases depending on the connection C that contains ϕ in Π1:
(a) C occurs between a formula σ in Γ1 and an assumption of the form α2u :
In this case, we can see that the premise ϕ of I depends on σ . Thus, each connection in Σ1 between ϕ and
σ contains an essentially modal formula ρ. Observe that ρ also occurs inΠ ∗1 and assures the correctness ofΠ ∗.
(b) C occurs between a formula σ in Γ2 and an assumption of the form α1u :
This case is similar to (a) above.
(c) C occurs between an assumption of the form α1u and the minor premise β of ♦E:
This case is similar to (a) above.
(d) C occurs between a formula σ in Γ1 and an assumption of the form α1u :
In this case, since C contains ϕ inΠ ∗1 and ϕ is modally independent of an assumption in Γ1 and assumptions
of the form αu1 , the correctness of Π
∗
1 is assured.
(e) C occurs between a formula σ in Γ2 and an assumption of the form α2u :
In this case, since C contains ϕ, it also contains a connection detour through an assumption µ in Σ1 that
is discharged in Σ2 by an application of→I, ¬I or ⊥c. Since µ is only discharged in Σ2, the premise ϕ of I
depends on µ. Thus, each connection in Σ1 between ϕ and µ contains an essentially modal formula ρ. See that
ρ also occurs in Π ∗1 and assures the correctness of Π ∗.
9 The other cases can be proved easily.
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(f) C occurs between an assumption of the form α2u and the minor premise β of ♦E:
This case is similar to (e) above.
(2) δ is of the form ♦ϕ, the conclusion of ♦I and the major premise of ♦E: In this case, Π1 is of the following form:
Γ1 [α1]u
@  
Σ1
ϕ
♦ϕ ♦I
Σ2
σ
σ ♦E, v
[ϕ]v Γ2 [α2]u
@  
Γ3 [α3]u
hhhh
hhhh
 
Σ3
β
where Γ = Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3, and α1u , α2u and α3u belong to the same assumption class [α]u .
It is important to see that ϕv is modally independent of σ , of the assumptions in Γ2 and of the assumptions of
the form α2u .
The resulting deduction Π ∗1 is of the form below. Since the connections that contain ♦ϕ also contain ϕ, and ϕv
is modally independent of σ , Γ2 and α2u , we can verify that the correctness of Π ∗ is assured.10
Γ1
@
[α1]u
 
Σ1[ϕ]
@
Γ2 [α2]u
 
Σ2
σ
@
Γ3 [α3]u
 
Σ3
β
(3) δ is a maximum segment of type (2):
This case is similar to case (3) in Section 3.2.1.
4. Weak normalization and subformula property
In this section, the weak normalization theorem and the subformula property will be proved. Before, we will present
some preliminary definitions and lemmas.
Definition 4.1 (Degree of a Formula). The degree of a formula α, d(α), is the number of connectives in α.
Definition 4.2 (Degree of a Segment). The degree of a segment σ , d(σ ), is the degree of the formula that occurs in it.
Definition 4.3 (Degree of a Deduction). The degree of a deduction Π , d(Π ), is defined as d(Π ) = max{d(σ ): σ is a
maximum segment in Π of type (1) or (2) in Definition 3.3}.
Segments that follow the pattern (3) in Definition 3.3 are non-usual since they do not contribute to the degree of a
deduction. Nevertheless, they must be removed in order to prevent the appearance of maximum segments that follow
patterns (1) and (2), the ones that really disturb the normalization procedure.
Definition 4.4 (Length of a Deduction). The length of a deduction Π , l(Π ), is the number of formula occurrences
in Π .
10 For n,m ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the reader may try each combination between formulas in Γn and assumptions of the form αm , as well as each combination
between assumptions of the form αm and the minor premise β of ♦E for more detailed proof.
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Lemma 4.5. LetΠ be a deduction inCS5 of α from Γ with d(Π ) = n such that every maximum segment σ with degree
n that contributes to the degree of Π is a conclusion of an application of an introduction rule, or of an application
of the intuitionistic absurdity rule ⊥i , and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule. Then, Π
reduces to a deduction Π ′ of α from ∆ (∆ ⊆ Γ ) such that d(Π ′) < d(Π ).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one in [14]. 
The normalization procedure is based on the strategy proposed by [5,13] for first-order classical logic to cope with
the combined use of classical negation, disjunction and the existential quantifier. As presented below, we here extend
such results to deal with  and ♦ too.
Lemma 4.6. Every deduction Π such that d(Π ) = 0 reduces to a normal deduction Π ′.
Proof. If Π is normal, Π ′ = Π . If Π is not normal, then the result is obtained by induction on K , where K is the
sum of the lengths of all maximum segments in Π . Choose a maximum segment σ in Π such that there is neither
another maximum segment above it, nor above (or that contains) a formula side-connected to the last formula of σ .
Let Π1 be the reduction of Π that eliminates the maximum segment σ . By using the reduction steps (3) (b)–(e) used
to eliminate maximum segments of type (3) (see Definition 3.3), we can note that the induction value of Π1 is smaller
than the value of Π . The result follows immediately. 
Lemma 4.7 (Critical Deduction). Let Π be a deduction in CS5 of β from Γ such that: (1) β is the conclusion of an
elimination rule such that the major premise α is the last formula occurrence of all maximum segments in Π , and (2)
d(Π ) > 0. Then Π reduces to a deduction Π ′ of β from ∆ (∆ ⊆ Γ ), such that d(Π ′) < d(Π ).
Proof. By induction on l(Π ). The cases depend on α. The first two cases are used to eliminate maximum segments
of type (1), and the last case is for maximum segments of type (2) (see Definition 3.3):
(1) α is a conclusion of an application of an introduction rule, or of an application of the intuitionistic absurdity rule
⊥i , and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule: the result follows from the operational
reductions and the intuitionistic absurdity reduction.
(2) α is a conclusion of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E, and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination
rule. We will analyse the case such that the applied rule is ♦E. The other cases are similar.
Let Π be the following deduction, and R an elimination rule:
Π1
♦δ
[δ] j
Π2
α
α ♦E j Σ3
β
R
Π reduces to Π ∗:
Π1
♦δ
[δ] j
Π2
α Σ3
β
R
β
♦E j
If d(Π ∗) < d(Π ), then Π ′ ≡ Π ∗.
If d(Π ∗) = d(Π ), then the sub-deduction of Π ∗ determined by β has the form of the lemma. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis,
[δ] j
Π2
α Σ3
β
R
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reduces to
[δ] j
Π4
β
with d(Π4) < d(Π ).
In this case, Π ′ is:
Π1
♦δ
[δ] j
Π4
β
β
♦E j
and d(Π ′) < d(Π ).
(3) α is a conclusion of an application of ⊥c, and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule.
Let Π be the following deduction, and R an elimination rule:
[¬α]k
Π1⊥
α ⊥c k Σ2
β
R
Π reduces to Π ∗:
α j Σ2
β
R ¬β i
⊥
[¬α] j
Π ∗1⊥
β
i
Π ∗1 is obtained from Π1 by substitution of all deductions of the following shape
Πn
α ¬αk
⊥
to
Πn
α Σ2
β
R ¬β i
⊥.
By condition (1) of this lemma, only two types of maximum segments σ may appear in Π ∗:
• σ is a conclusion of an application of an introduction rule, or of an application of the intuitionistic absurdity rule
⊥i , and it is, at the same time, a major premise of an elimination rule: the result follows from Lemma 4.5.
• σ is a conclusion of an application of ♦E, ∨E or ∃E, and it is, at the same time, a minor premise of ¬E, where
the major premise is a top formula: this type of maximum segment does not increase the degree of Π ∗. Thence,
Π ′ ≡ Π ∗. 
Theorem 4.8 (Weak Normalization). Every deduction in CS5 reduces to a normal form in an effective way, by using
the reduction steps.
Proof. Let Π be a deduction in CS5 of β from Γ , then Π reduces to a normal deduction Π ′ of β from ∆ (∆ ⊆ Γ ).
The proof is by induction on the pair (d(Π ), l(Π )). All possible cases are listed below:
• If the last inference of Π is an application of an introduction rule or of an absurdity rule, then the result follows
from the inductive hypothesis.
• If the last inference of Π is an elimination rule, then Π is of form:
Π ≡
Π1
α1 . . .
Πn
αn
β
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By using the inductive hypothesis, each Πi , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), reduces to a normal deduction Π ′i . Consider the
following deduction Σ :
Σ ≡
Π ′1
α1 . . .
Π ′n
αn
β
If Σ is normal, then Π ′ ≡ Σ . If Σ is not normal, then Π ′ is obtained from Σ by using Lemma 4.6 when
d(Σ ) = 0, or by Lemma 4.7 when d(Σ ) > 0. The result follows from the inductive hypothesis. 
Corollary 4.9 (Subformula Property). Every formula occurrence in a normal deduction in CS5 of α from Γ has the
shape of a subformula of α or of some formula of Γ , except for assumptions discharged by applications of the classical
absurdity rule, and for occurrences of ⊥ that stand immediately below such assumptions.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one presented in [14]. We have first to define the notion of path, and then prove
that all normal deductions follow a specific pattern where all elimination rules (E-part) come before introduction rules
(I-part) in a path. 
5. Finale
Although natural deduction systems for modal logics were deeply investigated by Prawitz and others, until now
no normalizable natural deduction system was proposed for full classical S5. Here we presented such a system with
rules for all connectives, quantifiers and modal operators. Since our version of the reduction ad absurdum rule is not
restricted to atomic conclusions, new reductions were necessary to cope with the combined use of ♦/∨/∃ and ¬. We
also gave a proof of the weak normalization and the subformula property. All lemmas and the main theorem presented
in Section 4 do not explicitly mention that the underlying rewriting process in the normalization procedure does
preserve correctness. This is done in Section 3.2 where we proved that all global restrictions related to the connections
in the application of I and ♦E are obeyed, even if the operational reductions for ♦/ and the reductions for classical
absurdity are applied.
Our rule for ♦E is quite new, based on the notions of essentially modal formulas and connection, previously defined
and used by Prawitz in the definition ofI in S5. Rules for ♦ allow us to analyse the individual deductive power of this
modal operator, and its interaction with all other logical symbols. The elimination rule for ♦ was primarily inspired on
the notion of linked formulas by a parameter in a deduction, proposed by Prawitz in [14]. With such a notion, Prawitz
proved the lemma on parameters that has, among other consequences, the following one: every proper parameter in
Π is a proper parameter of exactly one application of ∀I or ∃E in Π . Lemma on parameters is used to assure that,
after reduction steps, the rewriting process preserves all global conditions in the applications of ∀I or ∃E. In the case
of our modal rules, the notion of formulas being linked by a parameter was “translated to” the one of formulas being
essentially modal.
Comparing our elimination rule for ♦ to the ones of the papers mentioned in the Introduction, two works deserve
attention: (a) the elimination rule for ♦ within the scope of a normalizable natural deduction system for intuitionistic
modal logics [18]; (b) the elimination rule for ♦ in a cut-free sequent presentation for classical S5 modal logic [2]. In
the first case, rule ♦E is
x : ♦α
[y : α] [x Ry]
Π
z : β
z : β ♦E
with the following restriction: y must be different from both x and z and must not occur in any open assumption upon
which z : β depends other than the distinguished occurrences of y : α and x Ry.
Rules of this system embody the possible world interpretation of the modalities. Thus, x Ry asserts that a world
y is visible (accessible) from a world x . Beyond rules for logical symbols, this system also has rules expressing
conditions on the visibility relation. Hence, as an advantage of this approach, it is possible to give a uniform family
of natural deduction systems applicable to a whole range of different modal logics. The author also gives another
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reason for dealing with semantics in his system11: “for the intuitionistic modal logics we consider, we do not know
any other way of formulating a complete system with good proof-theoretical properties such as normalization and
the subformula property. (Here all the problems are caused by the ♦ connective. Complete, well-behaved systems for
the ♦-free fragments are easily obtained.)” Our natural deduction system for full S5 modal logic is, thus, a proposal
that allows one to formulate modal rules without appealing to additional rules to cope with modal semantics and
accessibility relations.
As said before, the second work that deserves attention in our comparison is a cut-free Gentzen system for full
classical S5 presented in [2]. The left rule for ♦ is
Γ , α ` ∆
Γ ,♦α ` ∆ ♦L
with the following restriction: let Π be a deduction of Γ , α ` ∆. Then, in order to apply ♦L, none of the formula
occurrences in Γ and ∆ depend on the occurrence of α in Π .
Brau¨ner’s notion of dependency is dual to our notion of modal independency (see Definition 2.4), and his definition
of a modally closed formula, used to define dependency, is exactly as our definition of an essentially modal formula
(see Definition 2.1). He also uses a concept of connection which is, in a sense, the “translation” from natural deduction
to sequent calculus formulation of Prawitz’s original concept of connection. Such similarities are not surprising
since both approaches are primarily founded on Prawitz’s ideas of linked by a parameter (see definition 3.3 in [2]),
essentially modal formulas and connection. However, although both the figure of sequent rules forR and♦L and also
the global restrictions are symmetrical, it is not the case of our I and ♦E rules: the figure and the global restrictions
are completely different. Moreover, as in the case of classical first-order logic without restrictions to reduction ad
absurdum, and with rules for all logical symbols including ∨ and ∃, the normalization proof for full classical first-
order S5, including ♦, is much more complex than cut-elimination.
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